12

Review

Levinas's Reading of Spinoza

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Richard A. Cohen, *Out of Control: Confrontations between Spinoza and Levinas*. Albany, SUNY, 2016.

The new book by Richard A. Cohen, director of the Institute for Jewish Thought and Heritage at the University of Buffalo, New York, seeks to place in confrontation two philosophers, Spinoza and Levinas, who are largely in conflict on many fundamental themes. It should be remembered that the author is particularly well equipped to conduct such a confrontation. He personally knew Emmanuel Levinas, notably during the academic year 1974–1975 at the University of Paris-Sorbonne, and he translated several of his works into English.[1] He also began his university career in the 1980s, teaching Spinoza's philosophy.

The author justifies the title of his book, *Out of Control*, as characterizing Emmanuel Levinas' anti-Spinozism. He points out that Spinozism represents the control par excellence, in the sense of totalization, of global rationality, of the exclusive unlimited being of duty-to-be, of perseverance for perseverance, similarly enclosing infinity and freedom in the order of necessity alone. In this sense, the *Out of Control* aims to show the height, orientation, and nobility of a freedom that takes charge of moral responsibility toward others, despite all the difficulty of accomplishment and

self-sacrifice that it requires.[2] The book covers many themes, expressed in its eight chapters: (1) Levinas, Spinozism, Nietzsche, and the body; (2) the prophetic word in Levinas and Spinoza (and Maimonides); (3) Levinas and Spinoza: loving God without hope of return; (4) Levinas and Spinoza: justice and the state; (5) The Prince of Spinoza: for whom was the *Theological-Political Treatise* written?; (6) Levinas on Spinoza's erroneous understanding of Judaism; (7) thinking of nothing less than death: mortality and morality in Spinoza, Heidegger, and Levinas; (8) Spinoza's spleen: babies, food, and lunatics. Unable to review all these themes, we will limit ourselves to specifying some essential points of this confrontation between Levinas and Spinoza, which we will also interpret in relation to our personal reading of these two authors.

Levinas's Critique of Spinoza

In his 1937 review of Harry A. Wolfson's *The Philosophy of Spinoza* Emmanuel Levinas argued that Spinoza's approach to Judaism is inaccurate for at least three reasons.[3] First, the research of Vaz Dias and Van der Tak shows that Spinoza was not registered on the register of institutions of Jewish studies in Amsterdam. Contrary to what his biographers generally claim, Levinas thought Spinoza did not know the Talmud.[4] He therefore had access only to a "bloodless" biblical text and thus unable to grasp its true meaning.[5] Next, he emphasized that Spinoza reduced the Bible to an entirely human and natural text. Finally, he noted that Spinozist pantheism, by identifying the divine with nature, determined it uniquely within the straitjacket of *The Ethics*, posed as the exclusive standard of truth.[6]

According to Emmanuel Levinas, Spinoza's tour de force was to propose a form of rationalism, that allowed Christianity to be surreptitiously imposed on many Jewish intellectuals, without having himself accepted Baptism. In the words of Richard A. Cohen, Spinoza constituted the Christian "Trojan horse" in the Temple of Judaism.[7] Indeed, Spinoza has, on the one hand, accepted the Pauline supersessionism, according to which Christianity would come to incorporate Judaism, and, on the other hand, Spinoza has greatly promoted secular supersessionism as a cancellation of any form of religion.[8] Like Sabbatai Tsevi, Spinoza contributed to the emergence of secular Judaism, advocating not only the religious freedom of the Jews but also their emancipation from Judaism itself. Also, like Sabbatai Tsevi, Spinoza accelerated the assimilation of Jews to European culture.[9] Spinoza endorsed the double process, the substitution of Juda-

ism by Christianity, and the spiritualization of the biblical letter, without the commandments it is responsible for conveying. He thus asserted that Christians merely interpret in a spiritual sense what the Jews understood in a material way (*quae Judaei carnaliter*), but he jointly naturalized the divine incarnated in the body of Christ, while reading the Jewish Bible in a Christian spirit.[10]

For Levinas, in general Spinozist immanence is self-referenced and thus excludes any possibility of otherness that always implies the notion of transcendence. Indeed, otherness is expressed first in the feminine, which is "other for a masculine being not only because of a different nature but also inasmuch as alterity is in some way its nature."[11] This is why the misogynistic remarks Spinoza wrote in the *Political Treatise* do not seem out of step with the immanentist project of *The Ethics*, where Spinoza took over the misogynistic prejudices of his time.[12] He equated the "pity of women" (*muliebri misericordia*) with superstition (*superstitione*), and also noted "the inconsistency of women" (*mulierum inconstantia*), their "false heart" (*fallaci animo*) and other "vices" (*vitiis*).[13] He put on the same level the "delusional, the talkative, and the child" (*delirans, garrula, puer*), all believing in the illusion of free will, when they cannot contain their impulse to speak (*loquendi impetum*).[14] He also referred to "the inconsistency of women, (to) their deceptive soul and other rebattus vices (from *muffium inconstantia* and *fallaci animo* and *reliquis earundem decantatis vitiis*)."[15] What Richard A. Cohen calls "spleen" toward women, fools, and children, is in fact the Spinozist refusal of free will and human freedom, a freedom that Levinas keeps asserting, but which he supports in relation to responsibility for others.[16]

The Ethics of Spinoza and Levinasian Ethics

Richard A. Cohen emphasizes that Spinoza named his masterwork *The Ethics*, because true knowledge is not just a component of human existence but envelops it entirely within the natural totality. The *Deus sive Natura* thus encompasses all reality, and thus allows us to assimilate every religion, every value and every morality with the only natural necessity.[17]

However, *The Ethics*, according to Levinas, does not lead to a true morality. Indeed, according to Levinas, the absence of transcendence gives free rein to the "natural *conatus essendi* of a sovereign Self," which blurs the "face of others."[18] For Spinoza, it is desire and aversion that completely determine the value of a thing, not the object or the desired

person themselves. Pleasure or sorrow, although related to the possession or lack of possession of this thing, result only from our desire or aversion for it.[19] This is why we judge something as good (*bonum esse judicare*) because we "strive, want it, aspire to it and desire it (*volumus, appetimus, atque cupimus*)."[20] Conversely, a thing will be considered bad because we are moving away from it. The value remains purely immanent to desire and concerns the object and others only in a utilitarian way. Even "where men will be most useful to each other is when everyone seeks at the highest point his own useful (*suum utile sibi qu'rit*)."[21] Levinassian ethics oppose Spinozist utilitarianism; the Other must be the highest value, and responsibility for the Other takes the subject hostage to the very fact of the infinite demand of ethics, so that no one "can say: I have done all my duty. Except the hypocrite."[22] Against the immanence of the useful self-referencing, in the service of the only conatus, the presence of the Other, for Levinas, is fundamentally different, that is to say transcendent of the subject herself.[23] The otherness of the Other is incompatible with the monism of the Spinozist substance, which necessarily reduces the Other to the same, and as a result, the absence of transcendence always ends up leading to the destruction of the moral relationship as concern for the Other.[24]

Richard A. Cohen recalls that, for Spinoza, love is mediated by the idea, it is only posed as "the joy that accompanies the idea of an external cause (*quam letitia concomitant idea causæ extern*)."[25] While this love is first immanent to the individual, and remains mediated by the idea, Levinassian love opens to the infinity of the Other, which presents itself both in its corporality and in its alterity.[26] It is the opening of the face of the Other that reveals its infinity, which cannot be reduced to the enjoyment of the loving subject. For Levinas, love shows that "thought and freedom come to us from the separation and from the consideration of the Other—this thesis is at the antipodes of Spinozism."[27] The latter, denying contingency and freedom, is strictly amoral, for it opposes an ethic of responsibility. By this, others seem to me "as if he were unique in the world—beloved."[28] This allows Levinas to define an ethical intelligibility, which preserves both free will and moral action.[29]

The Love of God

Richard A. Cohen underlines the convergence between Levinas and Spinoza concerning the notion of the love of God, for which nothing can

be demanded in return, but he also insists on the refusal of the former to the identification of the intellect and the will, which the latter operates precisely: "The will and the intellect are one and the same thing (*voluntas and intellectus unum, et idem sunt*)."[30] Levinas contrasts it with ". . . the entire pathetic experience of humanity. . . . This opposition is inspired by the certainty of the surplus. . . an incessant surplus that accomplishes the infinitude of infinity."[31] This surplus refers to the overflow of the "truth about being," which Levinas illustrates with the metaphor of the " 'curvature of intersubjective space,'. . . (that is) perhaps, the very presence of God."[32]

Let us remember that, for Spinoza, the intellectual love of God (*amor Dei intellectualis*) derived from the Third Kind of Knowledge, and therefore this love is eternal.[33] This is why, outside of temporal affairs, "God strictly speaking, loves no one and hates no one (*Deus proprie loquendo neminem amat neque odio habet*)."[34] It is only indirectly that "God as he loves himself, loves men (*quod Deus quatenus seipsum amat, homines amat*)" Spinoza told Blyenbergh that "all our bliss consists of the love of God, and that this love necessarily follows the knowledge of God (*summa nostra beatitudo in amore erga Deum consists, attendit, quodque ille amor necessario ex Dei cognitione*)."[35] However, in the *Ethics*, love for God (*erga Deum amor*) differs from God's intellectual love, for it is attached to all the affections of the body.[36] However, even under this type of affection, as Leibniz pointed out in the *Animadversiones,* love for God, for Spinoza, "is merely a parade costume for the people (*non-nisi ad populatulum phaleras esse*)," insofar as "there can be nothing aimiable (*nihil is amabile*) in a God, which produces without choice from all eternity both good and evil. God's true love is not based on necessity, but on bounty (*verus Dei amor fundatur non in necessitate sed bonitate*)."[37] With regard to the *amor intellectualis Dei* itself, Spinoza claims, as Arne Naess noted, only a love extending, without ontological distinction, to the whole universe. This love includes both animal species and the inanimate world.[38]

Against the impersonal eternity of the Spinozist God, Levinas privileges the word of God expressed through the prophets of Israel, expressed in the "infinity of time . . . better than eternity, which is an exasperation of the 'present,' an idealization of the present."[39] It is first in the ethical relationship that "my relation to God—comes to me in the concreteness of my relation to the other man."[40] The latter, on the one hand, opposes any theology, which deals with "God as if he belonged to the being or to perception," and on the other hand inserts responsibility into a "meta-ontological structure" beyond the being itself.[41]

It should also be noted that, as Richard A. Cohen points out, though neither Spinozism nor Levinas's philosophy can be considered mystical, it still seems possible to clarify Levinas's opposition to Spinoza through notions close to Kabbalah, such as those of infinity, the face, and the trace.[42] Although Levinas did not see Jewish mysticism in a favorable light, he had nevertheless written the preface for the French translation of Rav Hayym de Volozhin's *Nefesh Ha-Hayym*, in which he referred to the *Zohar*, and the esoteric teaching of the Vilna Gaon. As Charles Mopsik has noted, even though the Levinassian infinity relates more to the Cartesian infinity than to the Kabbalistic *Eyn Sof*, Levinas has nevertheless developed theses that are consistent with several fundamental notions of the Lurianic Kabbalah, notably the *Tzimtzum* (withdrawal or retraction) of infinite divine light.

We have shown, moreover, that Spinoza cannot accept this notion.[43] Applied to intersubjectivity, the theory of *Tzimtzum* allows us to think of the Other as a decentralization of the Ego, and thus as a break of totality. Such a shift does not constitute a loss of perfection, but the condition of existence as a creature.[44]

Justice and the State

Cohen notes that while Levinas and Spinoza seem to agree on the need to establish justice and political authority, they differ profoundly on the how to conceive the nature of this dual necessity. On the one hand, the relationship to morality and religion, and on the other, ontology and metaphysics.[45] In fact, the essential point of divergence between Levinas and Spinoza is the transfer of fidelity from the Creator to absolute loyalty to the state, which Spinoza endows with total authority. According to Spinoza, it is for the state to control religion, whereas for Levinas, religion must guide political and social life.[46] In the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, Spinoza sought to articulate man's love for God and man's love for his neighbor, thus summing up the content of Scripture: "loving God more than anything, and his neighbor as oneself (*Deum supraa omnia amare et proximum tanquam se ipsum*).[47] If God, as a substance made up of an infinite number of attributes that cannot be imitated, how can his justice and charity remain accessible to man? In the words of Jacqueline Lagrée: "The indefinity of ethical requirement is the correspondent of the infinity of divine qualities."[48]

Although, unlike justice, he does not explicitly define charity (*Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, XVI, 10), Spinoza suggests that these two notions allow man to name God, and refer not to sentiments but only works to be accomplished. However, for Spinoza, justice and charity can only become effective by state law (*ex jure imperii*), which is why their exercise requires obedience to the laws of the state.[49] The *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* thus sketches a form of morality, founded on obligation and obedience, independent of the real knowledge that man may have of divine necessity, advocated by *The Ethics*. However, because justice and charity only fall under the sovereign, and have no existence in themselves, they cannot have the universal content of adequate ideas.[50] Thus, morality, like religion, cannot compel subjects, except by civil coercion, for Scripture "does not condemn ignorance (*ignorantiam*), but only insubordination (*contumaciam*)."[51] The purpose of the Spinozist state is not so much to defend the freedom of citizens, but first of all its own security and stability. The preservation of the state takes precedence over that of the individual, for "piety towards the homeland is the highest degree of piety" (*quod pietas erga patriam summa sit*). This absolute valuation prevails over all moral considerations, to the point of legitimizing a true reversal of values. Thus, in line with Machiavelli, Spinoza affirmed that it is necessary to consider as "pious an unholy act (*impium committi*) towards the neighbor, if it is done for the conservation of the Republic (*si propter reipublicae conservationem fiat*)."[52] For Levinas, true morality and religion lie beyond state violence.[53] It should be noted that, while idolizing the state, Spinoza actually took up the traditional Jewish idea of the duty to pray for the stability of the state, without which "everyone would swallow alive his neighbor," as well as the obligation to respect the laws of the country where everyone resides (*dyn'a demalkout'a dyn'a*).[54] However, according to the *Talmud,* the obligation to respect the state cannot violate Jewish law, where state laws are in particular opposed to ethical imperatives.[55] As Cohen points out, the conception of the Spinozist state radically contradicts the long prophetic tradition of universal social compassion, as well as the ethical-redemptive policy it implies.[56] Where for Spinoza, pity (*commiseratio*), which does not differ essentially from mercy (*misericordiam*), is a sadness (*tristitia*), for Levinas the ethical responsibility toward others is expressed first in compassion toward him.[57]

Richard A. Cohen emphasizes Levinas's admiration for Spinoza, for his uncompromising rejection of superstition, his critique of anthropomorphic projections, and his critique of childish dependence on the religious. Both called for an "adult religion," even though their conceptions of such a religion were entirely opposed to each other.[58] Because Levinas conceived the human self as this permanent possibility of suspending his "*conatus essendi*" in order to be able to respond to the Other who "is nothing to him," he always opposed the Spinozist totality.[59] Levinas, who denounced in Heidegger the anonymous process of being, "without a carrier, without a subject," could only oppose what could be described as the "strange philosophy" of Spinozism, uniting the finite with an anonymous infinity.[60] Levinas, however, sometimes revealed what Jean-François Rey describes as "admiration and acknowledgement of Spinozism, that is, in the end, for philosophy itself."[61] In this sense, there is an ambiguity in Levinas vis-à-vis Spinoza. According to Dan Arbib, Levinas in fact had a dual relationship with Spinozism: an ontological opposition to *The Ethics*, for all the reasons we recalled in this article; but he also performed a religious rehabilitation of the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*.[62] In fact, Levinas even evokes an appreciation of the "internality of rational relations" specific to *The Ethics*, from which Judaism cannot be parted, as it cannot do without mathematics.[63] Moreover, Spinoza is said to have operated an ethical internalization of religion, allowing the desacralization of its pagan ties.[64] However, while Spinoza defined freedom as an existence driven by the "only necessity of its nature" (*sola suae naturae necessitate*), Levinas challenged the primacy of freedom as a measure of being.[65] It is the presence of the Other that calls into question the "naïve legitimacy of freedom" in the name of justice, for the ethical relationship exceeds freedom by the humanity of the Other.[66] At what Antonio Negri calls the "roundness" of the Spinozist being, which presents itself as an exclusive and flawless whole, Levinas contrasts the irreducible experience of the relationship with the other which, in the "face to face," exceeds any set of possible syntheses.[67]

Notes

1. *New Talmudic Readings* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1999); *Discovering Existence with Husserl*, co-translated with Michael B. Smith (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1998); *Time and the Other and Additional Essays* by Emmanuel Levinas (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1987); *Ethics and Infinity* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1985).

2. Richard A. Cohen, *Out of Control: Confrontations Between Levinas and Spinoza* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2016), 27–28.

3. Emmanuel Levinas, "Spinoza, philosophe medieval," *Revue des Etudes Juives*, I, 6 (1937): 114–19.

4. A. M. Vas Dias and W. G. van der Tak, "Spinoza Merchant & Autodidact: Charter Other Authentic Documents Relating to the Philosopher's Youth and His Relations" (Published originally in Dutch in 1932). English translation *Studia Rosenthaliana* 16 (1982): 154.

5. Emmanuel Levinas, "Have You Reread Baruch?" in *Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism,* trans. Sean Hand (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1990), 298n5. Concerning Spinoza's lack of interest in the Talmud, cf. M. Chamla, *Spinoza e il concetto della 'tradizione ebraica'* (Milan: F. Angeli), 127.

6. Emmanuel Levinas, "Spinoza's Background" in *Beyond the Verse: Talmudic Readings and Lectures,* trans. Gary D. Mole (London: Continuum, 1994), 164. Cohen, *Out of Control*, 198.

7. Cohen, *Out of Control,* 206.

8. Cf. M. A. Rosenthal, "Spinoza on Circumcision and Ceremonies, *Modern Judaism* 36, no. 1 (2016): 50.

9. Cf. J. J. Rozenberg, "Spinoza, le Spinozisme et les Sources de la Sécularisation" (book to be published).

10. Cohen, *Out of Control,* 191n1.

11. Emmanuel Levians, *Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo,* trans. Richard Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1985), 65.

12. Spinoza, *TP* VI, 37 (Paris: Ramond PUF), 205, 158–59.

13. Spinoza, *Ethique* II, 49, scolie de la seconde démonstration (Pautrat, Paris, Ed. du Rééd Seuil, 2010), 206–7; *Ethique* V, 10, scolie, 192–93.

14. Spinoza, *Ethique* III, 2, scolie, Pautrat, 220–21.

15. Spinoza, *Ethique* V, 10, scolie, Pautrat, 520–21.

16. Cohen, *Out of Control*, 296; Emmanuel Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence,* tr. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1998), 19–20.

17. Spinoza, *Ethique* IV, Préface, Pautrat, 352–53; *Ethique* IV, 4, démonstration, Pautrat, 366–67; Cohen, *Out of Control*, 108–9.

18. Emmanuel Levinas, *Alterity and Transcendence,* tr. Michael B. Smith (London: The Athlone Press, 1999), 33.

19. Spinoza, *Ethique* III, 9, scolie; *Ethique* III, 39, scolie.

20. Spinoza, *Ethique* III, 9, scolie, Pautrat, 230–31.

21. Spinoza, *Ethique* IV, 35, cor. 2, Pautrat, 408–9.

22. Levinas, *Ethics and Infinity,* 105–6.

23. Emmanuel Levinas, *Existence and Existents,* trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2001), 105.

24. Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority,* trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), 44.

25. Cohen, *Out of Control*, 86; Spinoza, *Ethique* III, 13, scolie, Pautrat, 236–37.

26. F. S. Scribner, "Extending Spinoza . . . For the Love of God! Spinoza, Levinas, and the Inadequacy of the Body" *International Philosophical Quarterly* 42, no. 2 (2002): 151–60.

27. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity,* 105.

28. Emmanuel Levinas, "The Other, Utopia, and Justice" in *Entre Nous: On Thinking of the Other,* tr. Michael B. Smith and Barbara Harshaw (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 227.

29. Cohen, *Out of Control*, 83–92.

30. Spinoza, *Ethique II*, Corollaire de la prop. 49, Pautrat, 194–95.

31. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity,* 217–18.

32. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity,* 291.

33. Spinoza, *Ethique* V, 33, Pautrat, 544–45. For a presentation of the idea of the Intellectual Love of God in Spinoza, cf. S. Nadler, "The Intellectual Love of God » in *The Oxford Handbook of Spinoza*, ed. M. Della Rocca (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 295–313. Yitzhak Y. Melamed has examined the enigmatic status of this notion in the system of *The Ethics*; "The Enigma of Spinoza's Amor Dei Intellectualis," in *Freedom, Action and Motivation in Spinoza's Ethics,* ed. N. Naaman-Zaudrer and N. Naaman (London, Routledge, 2019), 222–38.

34. Spinoza, *Ethique* V, 17, cor. Pautrat, 524–25; H. A.Wolfson, *Spinoza* II, 283.

35. Spinoza, *Ethique* V, 36, cor. Pautrat, 548–49. Spinoza, *Lettre 21* à Blyenbergh, G. IV, 127, trad. franç. 1147; cf. *TTP*, IV, 4, 186–87.

36. Spinoza, *Ethique* V, 18 cor. Pautrat, 526–27; cf. P. Macherey, *Introduction à l'Ethique de Spinoza - Cinquième partie: les voies de la libération* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1997), 50.

37. Leibniz, *Réfutation inédite de Spinoza*, ed. L. A. Foucher de Careil (Paris: Ladrange, 1854), 66–67.

38. A. Naess, *Spinoza and the Deep Ecology Movement* (Eburon: Delft, 1992), 5. This theme was studied in greater detail by Eccy De Jonge, *Spinoza and Deep Ecology: Challenging Traditional Approaches to Environmentalism* (New York: Ashgate, 2004), 85–108.

39. Levinas, "Philosophy, Justice and Love," in *Entre Nous,* 114.

40. Emmanuel Levinas, *Of God Who Comes to Mind,* trans. Bettina Bergo (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), xiv.

41. Emmanuel Levinas, *Humanism of the Other,* trans. Nidra Poller (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2003), 56. Emmanuel Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence,* 126. Cf. M. Nagasaka, "Altérité anarchique—Réconciliation de Descartes et Kant dans la dernière pensée d'Emmanuel Levinas," *ACTA UNIVERSITATIS CAROLINAE. Interpretationes Studia Philosophica Europeanea* 1, no. 2 (2016): 102–17.

42. Cohen, *Out of Control*, 6, 90.

43. J. J. Rozenberg, *Spinoza, le spinozisme et les sources de la sécularisation* (book to be published).

44. C. Mopsik, "La pensée d'Emmanuel Levinas et la Cabale," *Cahiers de l'Herne* (1991): 433, 435, 440.

45. Cohen, *Out of Control,* 103–18.

46. Cohen, *Out of Control*, 104.

47. Spinoza, *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, XII, 10, edition bilingue (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1999), 444–45. The translators refer to *Deuteronomy* 6:5, *Leviticus* 19:18, *Matthew* 22:34 and, *Mark* 12:28–31, note 30, 759.

48. J. Lagrée, "Spinoza et l'amour intellectuel du prochain," in *Spinoza, philosophe de l'amour*, ed. C. Jaquet, P. Séverac, and A. Suhamy (Saint-Etienne: l'Université de Saint-Etienne, 2005), 99.

49. Spinoza, *TTP*, XIX 3, 606–7. J. Lagrée, "Spinoza et l'amour intellectuel du prochain" in *Spinoza, philosophe de l'amour,* 100.

50. Cf. E. Garver, "Spinoza and the Discovery of Morality," *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 45, no. 3 (2005): 358–59.

51. Spinoza, *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, XIV, 8, 472. S. Frankel, "Spinoza's Response to Maimonides: A Practical Strategy for Resolving the Tension Between Reason and Revelation," *International Philosophical Quarterly* 45, no. 3 (2005): 322–24.

52. Spinoza, TTP, XI, 10, 614–15, cf. note 20 des traducteurs, p. 780, qui réfère à Machiavel, Discorsi, III, 41. Cohen also underlines the Machiavellian character of the Spinozist state. *Out of Control*, 214. On Spinoza's borrowing of the notion of virtue from Machiavelli see cf. L. Althusser, "Spinoza I," *Lignes* 18, no. 1 (1993): 93.

53. Levinas, *Beyond the Verse,* 171.

54. *Pirquev 'Avot* III, 2.

55. Babylonian Talmud, *Bab 'a Qam'a* 133a.

56. Cohen, *Out of Control*, 217.

57. Spinoza, *Ethique* III, Definition of Affects XVIII and Explication, Pautrat, 328–29. Emmanuel Levinas, *God, Death, and Time,* trans. Bettina Bergo (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000), 180.

58. R. A. Cohen, *Out of Control,* 24.

59. Emmanuel Levinas, *In the Time of the Nations,* trans. Michael B. Smith (London: Althone Press, 1994), 178.

60. F. Poirié, *Emmanuel Levinas : essai et entretiens* (Arles: Actes Sud, 1996), 101. A. Tosel, *Spinoza ou l'autre (in)finitude* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2008), 178–79.

61. J. F. Rey, "Levinas et Spinoza," in *Spinoza au XXe siècle*, ed. O. Bloch (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1993), 226.

62. Dan Arbib, "Les deux voies de Spinoza: l'interprétation lévinassienne de l'Ethique et du Traité Theologico-politique in *Revue de l'histoire des religions* 229, no. 2 (2012): 275–300.

63. Levinas, *Difficult Freedom,* 115–16.

64. J. F. Rey, "Levinas et Spinoza" in *Spinoza au XXe siècle*, ed. O. Bloch (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1993), 230. Cf. Hent de Vries, B. Weltman-Aron, "Levinas, Spinoza, et le sens théologico-politique de L'Écriture, *Pardès* 42, no. 1 (2007): 79–94.

65. Spinoza, *Ethique* I, Définition VII, 20–21.

66. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity,* 303.

67. A. Negri, *L'anomalie sauvage. Puissance et pouvoir chez Spinoza* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1982), 100–105. Levinas, *Ethics and Infinity,* 77.